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J.M.E. McTAGGART 1 S CRITIQUE OF THE IDEA OF GOD
I. Introduction.
A. Scope of thesis.
The subject of this thesis is J.M.E. McTaggart 1 s
critique of the idea of God. The purpose of the writer is
to present a descriptive and critical study of that critique.
It should be understood that this thesis is not intended to
be a treatment either of McTagjart's complete philosophy of
religion or of his metaphysical system as a whole. 1 Since
McTaggart is to be studied as a critic of a single hypothesis
rather than as an exponent of a systematic philosophy, it is
not antecedently necessary to examine the validity of his
metaphysical system. Due attention will be given, however,
to the relation of certain phases of his treatment of the
idea of God to his positive metaphysical views. Whatever
defense of the theistic hypothesis may be made by the writer
is intended to be not a complete putting of the case for
theism, but only a statement of what may be said for
tneism as against McTaggart 1 s critique of it.
B. Sources for thesis.
The principal sources for this study are Some
2Dogmas of Religion and The Nature of Existence
. The
former of these works present b the more thorough and
exten .ive treatment of the idea of God. The latter work

though published considerably later, does not diverge
fundamentally from the position taken in Some Dogmas of
Religion . Less important sources and bibliographical
materials may be found in the bibliography appended to
3this thesis.
C. Method of presentation.
In the presentation of material, no attempt
will be made to follow McTaggart 1 s order. The discussion
will take into account the definition of God, the internal
consistency of the idea of G-od, the arguments for the
existence of God, and external criticisms of the idea of
G-od. In that way, the principal points of view from which
McTaggart criticizes the idea of G-od will be presented.
Perhaps the tone of the subsequent discussion
will be appreciated better if it be understood that McTag-
4gart is a personal idealist and that the writer of the
thesis entertains a personalistic bias, McTaggart holds that
all reality is timeless and spiritual. The Absolute is
differentiated into individual selves which are its funda-
mental and eternal constituents. All the content of the
Absolute falls within these selves. Together they form a
unified and harmonious system, which is .overned by a principle
of infinitely regressive determining correspondence. This
system is the untimate and unexplainable fact of existence.
Reality is spiritual, but not a spirit. Its unity is given,
not externally derived.

II. The critique of the idea of God,
A. Definition of God: God is personal, supreme, and good.
God is defined by McTaggart as "a being who is
personal, supreme, and good.' To call God personal is to
ascribe to him the quality of being a self. That God is
supreme does not mean that he is omnipotent. Supremacy
denotes the possession of power much greater than that of
any other person. It means the power of God profoundly to
affect by his volition all existence external to himself.^
The goodness of God does not imply moral perfection on his
part, but only a moral minimum of the predominance of good-
ness. God must be more good than evil.
1. This definition current in contemporary Western theology.
McTaggart asserts that the characteristics of
personality, supremacy, and goodness are implied in the
idea of God as it is to be found in the theology of the
7Western world at the present time. He holds that popular
usage agrees at this point with theology.
a. Personality.
He points out that personality seems always to
be regarded as essential to the idea of God. Only person-
ality satisfies the religious demands of theism; it is
q
paramount for the ordinary conception of God. The term
"God" sometimes has been used to designate an impersonal
#
reality. It is probable, however, that in those cases the
word was intended to represent worthy substitutes for G-od.
Some philosophers, Hegel and Spinoza, for instance, have
used "G-od" to mean all that truly exists, provided that it
has some kind of unity. 10 The objection to this usage is
that while the totality of existence is commonly called the
Absolute or the Universe, there is no name but G-od for a
supreme and good person. It may be added that certain
other philosophers abide by the theological use of the
term. Furthermore, to define God as all that exists would
make the question of the existence of God a trivial one to
all except complete skeptics and extreme pluralists • The
important problem of the existence of God would then be
replaced by the problem of the nature of God.
b. Supremacy.
According to McTaggart, the attribute of
supremacy, but not of omnipotence, also is held to be
essential to the idea of God. No person is called God who
is not the supreme beinn: in the universe, or at least one
12
of a limited number of such beings. Most theists, to be
sure, would profess to believe in the omnipotence of God,
but they would not mean it strictly. "To call God omni-
potent is a piece of theological etiquette from which
1^5
few theists seem capable of escaping." As I shall show
14below, McTaggart holds that the hypothesis of a non-

5creative God who is one of a number of persons whose exist-
ence is as ultimate as his own is self-consistent . This
view, however, seems to be inconsistent with a statement
that McTaggart makes in another place. In a review of G-.H.
Howison's The Limits of Evolution , he says, "Ever since
the spread of Christianity God has meant for the Western
world, a person who is the sole self-existent being.
He implies that he accepts this notion as a part of his
definition of God. There are several reasons, however,
for believing that this seeming inconsistency is not very
important: (l) the statement in the review appears only once
in McTaggart 1 s writings and at a time earlier than his
consideration in Some Dogmas of Religion of the hypothesis
of a non-creative God; (2) that hypothesis receives careful
and fairly extensive treatment; and (3) the hypothesis
represents the only idea of God that McTaggart believes
is consistent. It is true that God is generally conceived
to be the creator of the universe, but the hypothesis of
a non-creative God does not do essential violence to the
definition of God, though it may place in doubt the fact
of God's supremacy.
c. Goodness.
McTaggart 's position that the accepted defini-
tion of God requires the quality of goodneBS in God as
sound. He says that most theists believe that G-od is
Ii
morally perfect. In that, surely, he is right, but I cannot
agree with him that God need be only more good than evil.
The demand for moral perfection in God is so general that
McTaggart is not justified in omitting it from his defini-
tion. Even theists who deny God's omnipotence retain
belief in his perfect goodness. God's volitions must be
completely good from the formal point of view. But it may
be, although he does not say so, that McTaggart means that
God's material goodness must exceed the amount of objective
evil that is produced by his actions. Many theists admit
that the world that God has created contains much evil, but
none holds that God's responsibility for the existence of
evil is of such a nature as to impair his intrinsic goodness
McTaggart ' s motive for saying that God need not be perfectly
good may have been that he wanted to make provision for his
later conclusion that the only kind of God that could exist
could not, because of his relations to other selves, be
16
morally perfect. If McTaggart 's statement is to be inter-
preted from the material point of view, it is at least mis-
leading, for he does not say that it must be so interpreted.
If it is to be taken formally, it is incorrect. At any rate
he is right when he says that God must be good.
d. McTaggart 's claim for definition true on the whole.
McTaggart 's definition of God is substantially
what he claims it to be, namely, the definition used in
•
Western theology. I think that McTaggart has probably
underestimated the significance that theists in general
attach to the doctrine of the omnipotence of God. Mere
"theological etiquette" does not account for the nearly
universal acceptance of that doctrine by those who believe
in G-od. It seems to many thinkers to meet a fundamental
demand of the religious consciousness. Although the
omnipotence of G-od may be an inconsistent doctrine, its
significance for the great majority of theistic thinkers
must not be overlooked. As for the goodness of G-od,
McTaggart errs seriously if he intends us to believe that
the accepted definition of God does not imply God's moral
perfection. Neither of these defects, however, is of such
a nature as to obscure the critical points in McTaggart'
s
discussion of the doctrine of theism.
e. Use of theists' definition clarifies McTaggart 's discussion.
In fact, one of the chief virtues of McTaggart'
s
treatment of the idea of God is his use of the definition
stated above. Although he is an atheist, McTaggart bases
his handling of the idea of God on a definition that is
recognized by theists. This method enhances the clarity of
the discussion and prevents the missing of the vital points
at issue between atheism and theism. Many humanists and
popular critics of theism might well copy McTaggart 's example
of choosing an accepted definition of God and then frankly
•I
•
announcing whether he accepts the doctrine of the existence
of such a being as the one defined. Arbitrarily novel uses
of the term HGod M tend to confuse thought on this important
problem,
2. McTaggart justifies acceptance of his definition.
It is on the fact of the need for clarity and
common understanding in discussions about the idea of God
that McTaggart bases his justification of the use of this
definition which he says is that of modern Western theo-
logy. He says that the balance of convenience is in
favor of the usage that he urges. He holds that if certain
philosophers do not prefer this usage, philosophy ought to
17give way here to theology and popular practice. McTag-
gart' s demand is justifiable, especially in view of the fact
that the theological definition is probably more widely
accepted in philosophy than is any other.
B. Consistency of the idea of God.
McTaggart has d fined God as personal, supreme,
and good. Let us now see what he has to say about the con-
sistency of the idea of God so defined. His discussion of
this question takes the form of an examination to determine
what degree of power may be ascribed to God in compatibility
with his personality and his goodness. Is God omnipotent
in the fltriQt sense of the word? Has all other existent
reality been created by God, or are there other beings whose
I
existence is as ultimate as G-od's? These two questions
suggest three hypo these*: God may be (l) omnipotent and
creative, (2) non-omnipotent and creative, or (3) non-
omnipotent and non-creative. 1^
1. G-od as omnipotent and creative.
The theory that God is omnipotent and creative
holds that all reality other than G-od has been created by
19him and is completely dependent on him. G-od is not at all
dependent on external reality; he has produced it by a
purely self-determined act. The nature of his creation and
the changes in it are due entirely to God's will, for there
are no limitations on his will that can hinder its fulfilment.
There arise two objections to the idea of G-od
as omnipotent and creative. The first objection is that
omnipotence is incompatible with personality. The second
objection is that omnipotence in a creative G-od is incom-
patible with goodness in a creative God.
a. Omnipotence incompatible with personality.
i. Conception of omnipotent will contradictory.
The first argument against the compatibility
of omnipotence with personality is that the conception of
20
an omnipotent will is contradictory. The essence of the
argument is that G-od must be limited by such laws as the
laws of Identity, of Contradiction, and of Excluded Middle.
In other words, G-od's actions must be limited to those

that fall within the bounds of rational possibility. His
volitions could, not be directed, towards unreasonaole ends,
because the volitions of an omnipotent being would have to
be realized. If G-od could not do unreasonable things, he
could not be an omnipotent person. Therefore, since by
definition G-od is a person, he cannot be omnipotent.
The validity of McTaggart 1 s reasoning at this
point depends on the validity of the proposition that only
the rational can be real. If it was true that all reality
must conform to rationality, no being could be omnipotent,
for there would always be some things that each being
could not do. No being, that is, could do a rationally
impossible thing. It may be pointed out that the ration-
ality that is meant here is not the rationality objective
in all reality, the rationality that is the nature or all
reality, but the rationality of normal human minds. The
question is, Must all reality conform to the categories
under which certain parts of reality subsume all their
experiences? What reason is there for saying that all
reality must meet human ideals of rationality? Why must
G-od be bound by lav/s of human logic? The skeptic will
say that neither G-od nor reality as a whole need conform
to human rationality. It must be said, however, that such
an objection to McTaggart' s argument could be raised con-
sistently only by one who was so completely skeptical
that he would have no right to make any assertions of any

metaphysical significance. The validity of the laws of
human logic is the necessary presupposition of all
metaphysical discussion. This skeptical objection aside,
McTaggart's first argument against the compatibility of
omnipotence v.-lth personality must be acknowledged to be
valid.
il. Self-consclo jsneas and other-consciousness
•
::cTaggart's second argument against the compa-
tibility of omnipotence with personality is based on the
contention that an omnipotent person must be able to exist
without the existence of any other being.'""1' The conscious-
ness of an Other seems to be involved in that awareness of
self that constitutes personality. Human personality is
never found to exist without the recognition of the existence
of something other than Itself. An omnipotent being, however,
would have to be capable of existing without this limitation;
he v/ould have to be capable of existing without that which
seems to be essential to personality. Therefore an omni-
potent being could not be G-od, G-od being, by definition,
a person.
McTaggart does not present this argument as a
logically conclusive one.^ He admits that self-consciousness
is not the same as other-consciousness and that we have no
right to assert that they must be found together. He holds,

nevertheless, that it is unwise to build on the "abstract
possibility" that a being could exist who could have self-
consciousness without other-consciousness. As McTaggart
admits, the argument is weak, if not quite invalid.
McTaggart ought not, however, to question the v.'isdom of
accepting the hypothesis of self-consciousness without
other-consciousness on the ground of the abstractness of
the possibility of its truth. Abstract possibilities
cannot arbitrarily be barred from metaphysical discussion.
b. Omnipotence is incompatible with goodness.
The second objection to the idea of God as
omnipotent and creative is, as I have said, that omnipotence
in a creative God is incompatible with goodness in a creative
God. ' If God is the omnipotent creator of all beings other
than himself, he must be conceived as the creator of all the
evil that exists in the world. Even the volitions of free
human beings are admitted to be dependent ultimately on the
will of God. If God is omnipotent, he could have prevented
the existence of evil. If he could have prevented evil and
did not, he himself is evil. Therefore an omnipotent creator
cannot be God, for God, by definition, must be good.
McTaggart has here brought out a fundamental
objection to the doctrine of the omnipotence of God, if
God be conceived as good. If, as McTaggart says, a man
fails to prevent evil when he has the power to do so, we
i
say that he is evil. The same must be said of an omnipotent
creator who fails to prevent the creation of such an evil
world as this* The only excuse for such an act would be the
existence of limitations on the power of the agent. Such
limitations, however, could not be said to exist in the case
of an omnipotent creator. A good and creative God cannot,
be omnipotent.
i. Attempted rebuttals rejected..
Attempts to save the omnipotence of God by
questioning the validity of man's Judgment of the reality
of evil in the universe ana asserting that the universe
when viewed properly may be completely good meet with no
sympathy on McTaggart's part.
(A) Pain and sin really good?
He says that the view that pain ana sin really
are good though we think them evil involves complete
ethical skepticism. We would have no right to predicate
of anything that it was good. Hence we would be unable
to Justify belief in God, whose definition includes good-
ness. This argument cannot be used consistently by believers
in an omnipotent God. McTaggart's objection to this
argument does not imply that all pain is completely value-
less. He simply holds that whatever value it may have, it
cannot be perfectly good.
1
(B) Pain and sin do not exist?
iicTaggart also rejects the view that our
belief that pain and sin exist is a delusion. He says
that it is a fact that we at ' least think that evil exists.
Is it not, then, an evil that we should suffer this delusion?
Is it not an evil that we should have the truth about reality
hidden from us in this way? If it is a delusion that we are
deluded, is not that delusion in turn an evil, and so on
ad Infinitum? We must hold that evil exists. McTaggart is
right in holding that some evil must exist, but there may
be some question as to whether the evil of our being deluded
about reality is as great an evil as would be the existence
of all the evil that we ordinarily suppose to exist.
(C) G-od's goodness different from finite human goodness?
The attempt made by Pascal and Mansel to
defend the compatibility of goodness with omnipotence
on the ground that goodness in G-od is different from good-
27
ness in man is rejected by McTaggart. This view holds
that G-od's Infinite goodness is not to be measured in
terms of the finite goodness of man. The goodness of God
may be compatible with the existence of what our finite
standards condemn as evil. McTaggart' s objection is that
this Involves using "goodness" in contradictory senses.
God's goodness would be wickedness to us. The only motive
for calling him good would be to flatter him ana avoid
his disfavor. Such a course might be the lesser evil.
Even so, we could not depend on such a being for truth or
4i
t
(D) Call God good even though he is not?
Another line of defense is to call God good
even though we believe that, strictly speaking, he is not.
(1) Evil arises from free will?
One form of this defense is the contention
that sin arises from perversion of free will. Suffering
is in some way the consequence of sin. Thus evil is
necessarily the consequence of the exercise of the free-
dom of human will. Free will is held to be or such great
value that G-od was Justified in choosing It even witn all
its consequences of evil. McTaggart replies with two
objections: (a) the validity of this high evaluation of free
will may be doubter: , and (b) an omnipotent Goa coula
create a world in which men had freedom and where there
was no evil. 9
(2) Evil necessary in universe governed by universal laws?
The second form or this defense is that there is
bound to be some evil in a universe governed in accordance
with universal laws. Such a government of tne universe
is so great a perfection that God was
•
Justified in choosing
it in spite of the evil it involves. Similar objections
are raised to this view: (a) the high evaluation of uni-
versal laws may be doubted, and ( b) an omnipotent, being
could make laws that would exclude evil.
i
10
(3) Universe without evil would violate certain laws or logic?
The third form of this defense is that the
existence of a universe in which there was no evil would
violate such laws of logic as the Law of Contradiction or
31the Law of Excluded Middle. McTaggart implies that there
is no ground for believing "Chat there is any necessity for
choosing between these alternatives. He holds, moreover,
that if God did have to conform to these laws, he would
not be omnipotent,
11. Omnipotence and goodness: conclusion re-stated.
McTaggart's conclusion, then, is that there
is no good reason for his giving up his judgment that the
fact of the existence of evil in the world means that the
creator of the world cannot be both good and omnipotent.
He holds that since God must be good, he cannot, If he is
the creator of the world, be omnipotent.
c. McTaggart's use of 7omnipo^Jence ,, justified.
I see no reason why anybody should refuse to
agree with McTaggart when he says that people who call
God omnipotent and then say that there are tnlngs that he
cannot do are simply using the wrong word.^ Pringle-
Pattison says that the chapter on God as omnipotent in
Some Dogmas of Religion is, on the whole, rather fruitless
because of McTaggart's taking omnipotence as implying the
power to make contradictions true. He protests that
Ii
those whom McTaggart criticizes do not use the word in that
sense. McTaggart agrees, but holds that the terra ought so
to be used. McTaggart' s insistence on this point is not
trivial because, as he shows, confusion of thought arises
34from ambiguity in the application of the word. If G-od
is not actually omnipotent, the fact of his existence is
not sufficient guarantee that the universe holds more good
than evil. The precise limits of the power of a finite G-od
could be determined only after elaborate metaphysical
investigation. Therefore, to prove that the universe is
predominantly good, people appeal to the doctrine of the
omnipotence of G-od. This course of action is confusing if
the term "omnipotence" is not used strictly. If God is
not actually omnipotent in the strict sense of the term,
the real problem is hidden behind an apparent verbal
solution of it. If G-od is not omnipotent, he must not be
called omnipotent.
d. Conclusion: G-od cannot be omnipotent.
The result of McTaggart 1 s examination of the
consistency of the idea of G-od as omnipotent and creative
is his conclusion that G-od cannot be omnipotent. Omnipotenc
would be incompatible with God's goodness and with God's
personality. The hypothesis is inconsistent.
I
2. God as non-omnipotent and creative: goodness and power.
We may now consider McTaggart's discussion of
the consistency of the idea of G-od as non-omnipotent and
creative. At the center of the discussion is the question
35
of the power of G-od in relation to his goodness. The
denial of the omnipotence of God lias not included denial
of his creative power. Is that creativity compatible
with G-od's goodness? If God has created the universe and
it is found to contain evil, may we not yet save the good-
ness of G-od by ascribing the existence of evil to limita-
tions on his power? The distinction between antecedent
and consequent volition points to a possible solution on
this basis. "We will antecedently that which we desire
in all respects. We will consequently that which, under
the circumstances, we prefer to any other alternative
36
which the circumstances leave possible." A person's
antecedent volition may be thwarted by external circum-
stances, and he may be forced to will consequently what
he would not freely choose. If his consequent volition
produces evil, the person cannot be held morall respon-
sible for the existence of the evil. Now, is it not
possible that God wills antecedently the good, but he is
forced by the limitation of his field of choice to will
consequently what from the ideal point of view is evil?
4
a. External limitations on God's power impossible.
When a man wills to do a thing and cannot do
it, his impotence is never due solely to his own nature,
for he is dependent on reciprocal action between himself
37
and the rest of the universe. But in the case of a crea-
tive G-od, there could be no effective external limitations
on his power to produce what he willed antecedently. In
the beginning G-od would be the only existent reality. He
could, therefore, suffer no limitations external to his
own nature. The creator would be completely self-deter-
mined in the act of creation. If, then, he created evil,
he would be evil.
b. Internal limitations meaningless.
The only other possibility is that of there
being morally extenuating limitations within the nature of
G-od. Such a suggestion is, according to McTaggart, mean-
ingless •
G-od endeavors to produce whatever he wills ante-
cedently. The defeat of an antecedent volition
means a defeated effort. And what I am unable
to see is the possibility of explaining the de-
feat of the effort solely from the nature of the
being who made it. He only acts by his will.
And if his will is directed to a certain end,
can there be anything in his nature which can
hinder its execution?^
We ought not to hold to a div^ion in the nature of God
such that there would be a metaphysically incompatible
opposition between the will of God and the law of his
(
nature. The law of his nature is not a separate, ex-
ternal force, but a description of how he acts. It does
not control his nature, but expresses it. The law of
God's nature, then, cannot act on his will in such a way
as to thwart it. G-od's nature and his will are in com-
plete harmony. The insurmountable difficulty lies In the
necessity of explaining how God's nature can "at once
inpel him towards an end and yet be the sole obstacle to
39his realizing that end.' G-od's will and his power
sometimes are taken almost as separate beings, the ten-
dency to realize antecedent volitions being ascribed to
the former and the failure to realize them completely being
ascribed to the latter as limited in nature. This con-
stitutes an unwarranted disruption of the personality of
40God by division into abstract qualities.
c. McTaggart's conclusion: God cannot be creative.
Having denied the possibility of external
limitations on a creative God, and having found meaning-
less the idea of internal limitations of such a nature as
to excuse God's creating evil, McTaggart arrives at the
conclusion that creativity in God would be incompatible
with God's goodness. He thc-refore rejects the hypothesis
4-1
of a non-omnipotent and creative God.
d. Is McTaggart's conclusion valid?

McTag^art must be granted the point that there
could be no external restraints on the power of a creative
God. It must also be admitted that if there cannot be
internal limitations on G-od's power, the doctrine of the
creativity of G-od must be rejected. Since the possibility
of such internal limitations may well finally determine
whether the balance of thought will favor theism or atheis
it is desirable to examine more thoroughly the meaning and
validity of McTaggart's argument on that question.
i. The case against internal limitations.
(A) God's nature and his will.
Is the relation between God's nature and his
will such as to allow his nature to limit his power?
Let us first examine the case for LlcTaggart 1 s negative
answer to this question. That the nature of any given
being must be a specific nature is to be taken for granted
This means that there is a specific number of things that
any particular person will, or can, ever do. No person
wills what it is not in his nature to will. In fact, it
is impossible to do so. But once a person has willed in
accordance with his nature, he cannot at the same time not
will the end towards which that volition is directed.
There is no such thing as the existence simultaneously
within the same person of contradictory volitions.
The contradictions within human wills are never abso-
lutely simultaneous: either they are rapidly consecutive
11
or else the will has not yet taken a final attitude towards
the situation in which the contradictions arise. While a
person entertains a given volition, his own will cannot
at the same time be an obstacle in the way of the reali-
zation of the end of that volition. In such a case the
volition will be realized if there are no external limi-
tations on the power of the person. The person may cease
to will what he has been willing, but if he does so, it is
only because it is his nature for him to do so. Ke wills
or does not will a thing in accordance with the laws of his
own nature. The laws of his nature, however, are not forces
external to his will, but are descriptive laws, descriptions
of the ways in which he acts. The person acts only as will.
At a given moment the will is the active expression of the
entire nature of the person at that moment. The nature of
the person at any other moment does not at that moment exist,,
To conceive the nature of the person as thwarting the person's
will when once the will is directed towards an end is im-
possible: the nature of the will is to act as it does.
That the will could thwart itself is inconceivable.
Now, if at a given mor/.ent a person is willing
evil, the nature of that person is to some extent evil,
for the nature of the person is simply descriptive of the
quality of the will. This correspondence between the quality
of the person's nature and the quality of his will exists

because the will always acts in accordance with the nature
of the person. The creator must be completely self-
determined in the act of creation, for in the beginning no
other reality exists. If he wills the creation of an evil
world, his evil will is simply the active expression of his
evil nature. If God's will is evil and if his nature is evil,
certainly it may be said that God is evil. If God wills a
world that is partly evil, he is to that extent evil.
Creativity is not compatible with God's goodness. Therefore
God is not creative. Although McTaggart is not to be held
responsible for the details of the foregoing interpretation,
I believe that in general it is in harmony with his position.
(B) Obstructing experience within God?
Now, it might be asked, is it not possible that
there might be within the being of God an element of ex-
perience present in his consciousness independently of his
will, an element of experience somewhat analogous to sensation
in man? This experience-content would be something
against which the creator would have to struggle in order to
realize his ideals. The necessity for struggling would
constitute such a limitation on the creator's power as to
account for his creation of evil and allow for his being
called good. If this hypothesis can be shown to be
valid, it will remove the incompatibility between God's
creativity and his goodness.

There is an objection to this view, however.
All experience the creator has before he creates must be
entirely self-originated. Hence any experience-obstacle
present before the act of creation must have been produced
by something within G-od. Any part of God's experience
before creation must be, in order to have any effect on
his actions, the result of his active nature. G-od's
active nature is his will. Now, if the experience-obstacle
is the effect of God's will, it cannot be an obstacle to
G-od's will, for, as has been pointed out, the will of a
person cannot thwart itself. It now appears to be true that
there could not be in the experience of God any obstacle
to the fulfilment of his will that had its origin in God's
own being. It would seem that the creator's acts would be
autonomous. If he created evil, he could not be God.
Since the world contains both good and evil, the creator
of it must be either morally neutral or else alternately
good and bad accordins as he at different times creates good
or evil. These alternatives, of course, are not applicable
to God, for they are excluded by the definition of God.
ii. The case for internal limitations.
Now that the case against the hypothesis of
internal limitations on God's power has been stated, let us
review the question with the purpose of finding out whether
a view more favorable to the hypothesis is Justifiable,
II
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With much of the content of the foregoing arguments I am
in agreement. I cannot accept, however, their assumption
that the hypothesis requires the hypostasization of the
nature of God as a separate force acting upon, and opposing,
the will of G-od. I fully agree with McTaggart that God's
nature and his will must be in complete harmony, but I also
hold that the principle is not violated by the hypothesis of
internal limitations on God's power.
God's nature is revealed, or expressed, in
his activity. All God's activity is basically volitional,
that is, self-originated or self-determined.- The relation
between God's will and his nature is analogous to the
relation of form and content. It is a relation of com-
pletely harmonious and organic unity, not a relation between
two distinct forces or entities.
God's volitional activity is an organic unity
that is differentiated into desires, reason-processes,
purposes, intentions, conations, efficient activities,
self-perceptions, and so forth. The differentiations
within God's volitional activity are in harmony with one
another: neither their serial not their simultaneous
existence within the same being is contradictory. If an
analogy be sought, let the human self be considered. There
consciousness is at the same time both unified and diver-
sified. To deny that differentiations could exist within
\t
t
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the being of G-od is equivalent to holding that God must be
thought either under the category of indeterminateness or
under the category of pure being. Either of these categories
is quite inadequate to describe a being who is, by hypothesis,
the creator of a universe so rich in content as is the uni-
verse we know. The first category cannot be applied to any
existent being. The use of the second to describe G-od is at
once made impossible when it is held that any of God's
activity is immanent in a universe that is in any sense
external to him.
Now, if God's volitional activity as a whole
is in harmony with G-od's nature, and if there is harmony
betv/een the differentiations within God's volitional
activity, it may be said that each of the differentiations
is in harmony with God's nature. Each activity of God's will
appears or emerges because it is God's nature for that activity
to arise. G-od's nature is expressed not only in his voli-
tional activity as a whole, but also in the various specific
purposes, strivings, desires, self-perceptions, and so forth,
that are to be found within his will.
Let us now suppose the appearance within the
volitional activity of God of a desire for the realization
of a certain value. This desire emerges because it is
God's nature for it to emerge: there can be no contradiction
between God's nature and the existence of the desire.
<
Now, we may suppose that, by virtue of a kind of order or
rationality inherent in the nature of God, the appearance
of the desire will be followed by the appearance of an
activity directed towards the fulfilment of the desire.
This activity must be determinate in its quality, its
duration, and its effectiveness. Either the activity is
adequate for the realization of the end towards which it
is directed or it is inadequate for the realization of that
end. If the activity is adequate, the end will be realized,
for there can be no external limitations on the activity
of the creator. The only qualification to this statement
is that the existence of the end must not be rationally
impossible. If the activity is not adequate, the end will
not be realized.
Let it be assumed that the activity has been
directed towards the production of A, but has failed to
produce it. Now, it may be that the nature of G-od is such
that there next appears in God an activity that produces
the existence of B, an end whose existence would be incom-
patible with the existence of A. Does this situation mean
that there is a real contradiction within God? No ultimate
contradiction is involved. To be sure, the end A is the
contradictory of the end B, and the existence of A would
be incompatible with the existence of B. But according
to our hypothesis, B is the only end that has been realized.
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There__fore there is no real contradiction at this point.
It may be admitted, also, that "both the desire for A and
the activity that starts to produce A are contradictory
to the activity that produces B. The contradiction, however,
is not an ontological incompatibility; it merely stands for
a descriptive difference. Vicious opposition between vari-
ous volitions can be thought only if they are taken in
abstraction from the common nature with v/hich they are in
harmony and set up as active beings. But if all the volitions
are referred to the nature which they express, contradiction
disappears in the light of thsir ontological, as well as their
descriptive harmony as merely serially distinct manifestations
of the nature of a unified being.
On this hypothesis there is no strife between
God's nature and his will; neither must God's will thwart
itself. The failure of an antecedent volition to be realized
does not represent a "defeated effort" of the will, but only
an inadequate effort. The inadequacy of the effort does not
represent a limitation imposed on the volition, but simply
the determinateness of the volition. And all occurs in
harmony with the nature of God.
But it still remains to be 3hown that this
hypothesis would relieve God of moral responsibility for
the creation of evil. If God acts only by his will, and
if his activity sometimes produces evil results, is not God
I
evil? It is now necessary to point out that the arguments
that have been advanced against the hypothesis of internal
limitations that could save God's goodness have largely
been motivated by belief in the false notion that all
volitions must be approved by the willing being. There
can be both desiderative and non-desiderative volition.
I have defined volition as self-originated or self-determined
activity. There is no reason for holding that every volition,
or self-originated activity, must be caused by, or accompanied
by a desire for it or an approval of it. According to the
hypothesis that I have been developing, desires for good ends
may exist in God simultaneously with actions that produce
evil effects. Judged from the material point of view, God
might be said to be evil. But to be wrong materially does
not entail moral guilt. Judged from the formal point of
view, God might be said to be evil only if he entertained
evil intentions or desires. There is no antecedent objection
to the hypothesis that all God's desires, purposes, and
intentions would be good. If that was the case, God might
be morally good in spite of the fact that certain actions
of his caused the existence of evil.
ill. Conclusion: McTaggart's position is not valid.
The argument has been carried far enough to
show that the hypothesis of internal limitations on God's
power is compatible with the conception of the personality

of God. Furthermore, it has been shown that the existence
of these limitations would relieve G-od of moral responsibi-
lity for the existence of evil. Therefore the conclusion
is that McTaggart's rejection of the consistency of the
idea of G-od as non-omnipotent and creative is not valid.
3. God as non-omnipotent and non-creative: consistent.
We now move to McTaggart's discussion of
the consistency of the idea of God as non-omnipotent and
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non-creative. According to this theory, God is Just
a person among persons. He is greater in power and goodness
than the others, and is worthy of worship. His goodness
consists in his trying to reduce evil to a minimum, but
his success is uncertain. There is no antecedent impossi-
bility in the existence of such a God as this. Persons do
exist, and God may be simply one more person, different
only quantitatively from the rest.
4. McTaggart's conclusion on consistency of the idea of God.
The outcome of McTaggart's examination of the
question of the consistency of the idea of God is his
rejection of the hypotheses of an omnipotent and creative
God and of a non-omnipotent and creative God and his con-
clusion that there is no Inconsistency in the hypothesis
of a non-omnipotent and non-creative God.
His rejection of the first hypothesis is valid.

The two weak aspects of his treatment of It are the admit-
tedly inconclusive argument from the necessity of other-
consciousness and the rejection of the suggestion that
the value of free will might be so great as to justify God's
choosing to create free beings who would probably produce
evil. Freedom of will is requisite to all morality.
In minimizing the value of freedom, one minimizes the value
of moral experience. But admission that God was Justified
in creating free beings would not destroy the argument
against his omnipotence. In the first place, freedom would
account for moral evil and only some non-moral evil. The
remaining non-moral evil would have to be attribute:", to God.
In the second place, as McTaggart holds, an^f omnipotent God
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could create free beings 7/ithout evil consequences.
I have already indicated my reasons for believing
that McTaggart's argument against the second hypothesis
cannot be accepted. There can be no disagreement with his
conclusion that the third hypothesis is not inconsistent.
Such disagreement would be equivalent to the view that the
concept of personality is inconsistent. That that cannot be
true is proved by the fact that persons exist. According
to McTag/cart, the only consistent thelstic hypothesis is the
idea of a non-omnipotent and non-creative God. From my point
of view, there are two consistent thelstic hypotheses, namely,
the idea of a non-omnipotent and creative God and the idea
of a non-omnipotent and non-creative God. Which one of the

two hypotheses must finally be accepted, If one of them must
"be accepted, will be determined by theoretical and empirical
considerations to be discussed later,
C. Arguments for the existence of God.
1. Miscellaneous arguments.
Let us now turn to the arguments for the existence
of G-od. McTaggart rejects as insufficient to establish the
existence of any kind of G-od reasons supported only by appeal
to instinctive and Irresistible conviction of their truth.
He also will not accept the validity of the basing of belief
in the existence of G-od on miracles or on the argument that
disastrous results would follow from the non-existence of a
God.^ He cites Kant's classification of the arguments for
the existence of God as the ontological, the cosmological,
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and the phy sioo-theological , McTaggart believes the
ontological argument to have been adequately disposed of by
47Kant and does not give it serious consideration. He says
that Kant's cosmological argument resembles very closely the
argument from the necessity for a first cause. Kant's physico
theological argument is identified with the argument from
design. Since the two latter arguments are in frequent use,
1.'.cTaggart discusses their validity.
2. The argument from the necessity for a first cause,
a. For God as omnipotent and creative.
Let us first consider the argument from the

necessity for a first cause. McTaggart holds that the
existence of an omnipotent and creative G-od cannot be
proved by this argument. His statement of the argument is
48
as follows. Events continually occur in the world.
Every event must have had a cause. Every cause is an event
and thus must have had a cause. Existent non-divine sub-
stances cannot be said to be eternal. The beginning of
each such substance is an event that requires a cause. In
order to avoid an endless causal regress, it is necessary
to postulate an ultimate cause that is not an event requiring
a cause, but is a being who had no beginning and so needed
no cause. This being is G-od.
i. First cause versus infinite causal regress.
(A) McTaggart f s defense of infinite causal regress inconclusive.
The argument from the necessity for a first
cause is presented as an alternative to an infinite regress
of causes. Supporters of the argument hold that such a re-
gress is impossible. McTaggart, however, disagrees: he holds
that there is no ground to suppose that an infinite causal
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regress involves contradiction. If McTaggart were right,
the existence of a first cause would not be a necessary
hypothesis. But when the ground for his statement is
examined, it is revealed to be the acceptance of a view of
causation that holds that an effect can determine its cause
in just the same way in which the cause determines the
50
effect. McTaggart 's view of causation is that it is a
r
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transitive, reciprocal relation. He holds that an infinite
causal regress would therefore not be vicious and might
exist. This conclusion, however, is irrelevant, for the
causation to which the argument from the necessity for a
first cause refers is a non-reciprocal relation, representing
a non-reciprocal activity. According to McTaggart, causation
is "a relation of implication between existent realities
or, to put it more precisely, between existent substances .
"
It does not account for the existence of those substances;
it merely refers to their descriptive determination once
thay are in existence. Since the argument from the necessity
for a first cause refers to efficient causation, to say
that McTaggart ! s view of causation is compatible with the
idea of an infinite causal regress does not refute the
argument. It still may be true that the idea of an infinite
causal regress is self-refuting and that it supplies no
ultimate cause for the substances in the causal series.
(B) Infinite causal regress is contradictory.
Since I know of no valid argument in support
of the validity of the idea of an infinite causal regress,
I may now proceed to set forth the reasons for believing
that it is unsound. A causal regress can yield sufficient
causation only if the earliest event in the series is
52determined. But in an infinite causal regress there can
be no earliest event, for the idea of an infinite causal
r
regress is based on recognition of the principle that
every event must have been caused by an event earlier than
itself. Since there can be no earliest event in an infinite-
ly regressive series, such a series cannot be an adequate
causal principle. The very law that is essential to the
status of the infinite causal regress as an explanatory
principle makes it impossible for it to provide ultimate
causation. Infinite regress is not the realization of
causation; it is only the search for it,
ii. Existence of first cause cannot be proved.
McTaggart holds, nevertheless, that even if
an endless regress of causes is impossible, the position
53that a first cause can exist is untenable. The argument
for God as a first cause conceives God 1 s existence as
having no beginning in time. This means either that God
exists in time and has always existed in time or that his
existence is timeless, hence not requiring any beginning.
(A) Objections to argument on assumption that God exists in ti
In the first case, if God has existed through
infinite past time without being caused, why may not other
substances have done so too? "I cannot see why it should be
said, of three substances existing in time, that God did
not need a creator, but that a man and a pebble did."^
The question that McTaggart raises here points to a funda-
mental defect in the argument for the necescity for a first
(
cause as he has stated it. The argument depends on the
same lav/ of causality as does the idea of an infinite
causal regress. According to that law, every event must
have been determined "by a previous event or cause. To stop
at any point in the causal regress after having been led
there by acceptance of the causal law is an arbitrary vio-
lation of that law. If it is true that every event or
substance must have had a previous cause, then God, as well
as men or pebbles, must have had aprevious cause. In that
case G-od would not be the first cause. The causal principle
on which the argument for a first cause is based can lead
logically not to a first cause, but only to an infinite
causal regress.
McTaggart, still on the hypothesis of G-od's
existence in time, raises another equally valid objection
to the argument from the necessity for a first cause.
He says that in order to avoid the conclusion that there is
an infinite regress of causes (acts of volition are events
and require causes) within the mind of G-od, we must suppose
that God exists as the cause of changes without himself
changing. In that case the cause would first exist without
producing the effect, and would subsequently produce it.
This change in the action of the cause would be an event
that would have occurred without a cause. This would con-
stitute a violation of the lav/ of causality.-^
((
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(B) Objection! on assumption of timelessness of God's existence.
In regard to the second alternative, namely,
the timelessness of God's nature, McTaggart says that the
difficulty of ascribing an event to a cause that is unchanging
again confronts us, for a timeless be_ing is one that does
56
not change. Furthermore, if, to avoid this difficulty,
it is held that the non-divine substances have existed
through all past time, it must be acknov.Tledged that they
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never commenced to exist, and hence require no creator.
These two objections seem to me to be sound.
The same cannot be said for McTaggart 's criti-
cism of a suggested solution of the problem raised by the
assumption of the timelessness of G-od's nature. It is best
to quote McTaggart because of the difficulty of paraphrasing
57his ambiguous statement.
It has been suggested that the series of events in
time will appear, to a timeless being, as a time-
less reality, and may thus be due to an eternal
and unchanging volition of that being. But if the
true nature of what appears as temporal is timeless,
it is not really a series of events, and therefore
the law of Causality does not apply to it. It needs
a cause no more than God himself. And thus the
argument breaks down.
It is true that if the true nature of what appears to us
as temporal were really timeless, the law of causality
would not apply to it. But the hypothesis set forth in
the suggestion that McTaggart is answering is that what
appears to God as timeless and to us as temporal really
f
is temporal. Therefore it is a series of events, to which
the law of causality may be applied. McTaggart 's criti-
cism is quite beside the point. A better answer to the
suggestion would be that it does not relieve us of the
necessity for holding that a timeless cause would have to
cause changes without changing. McTaggart himself has
pointed out the difficulties involved in such a position.
The suggested solution succeeds in eliminating the infinite
regress within the mind of God, but it gives us no new
light on the question of how a changeless being can
cause changes.
(C) First cause and belief in human freedom.
McTaggart includes in his treatment of the
argument from the necessity for a first cause an objection
Intended to apply to believers in human free will. His view
is that the argument cannot be accepted consistently by
one who believes in human freedom. The law of causality
is not valid if human volition is not completely deter-
mined. If that law is not universally valid, the argument
has no force. 58
b. For G-od as non-omnipotent •
McTaggart holds that the argument from the
necessity for a first cause could not be used to prove
the existence of a non-omnipotent Q-od, because the consi-
derations already advanced against it as applied to an
(
omnipotent G-od do not depend on the omnipotence of the
first causer 7 There would "be special objections, he
holds, in the case of a non-omnipotent G-od who was non-
creative. In the first place, a non-creative G-od would
not be a first cause. In the second place, the hypo-
thesis of a non-creative God implies that non-divine
substances could exist eternally and in their own right.
Hence their existence would not imply the existence of a
6l
creator. Furthermore, the existence of God as the
cause of events would not be necessary, for any one of
the eternal non-divine substances could serve as the cause
of events. This completes McTaggart's refutation of the
argument for the existence of God from the necessity for
a first cause.
c. The argument could not prove personal and good cause exists.
Up to this point the discussion of the argu-
ment for the existence of G-od from the necessity for a first
cause has really dealt only with the argument for the
necessity for a first cause. McTaggart rightly points
out that even if this first section of the argument were
valid, it could not prove the existence of God, for G-od
must be personal and good. The argument could prove only
that there was a being who was a first cause; it could not
show that that being was either personal or- good. In order
to demonstrate the existence of G-od, the argument from the
necessity for a first cause would have to be supplemented
(
by the argument from design. Whatever else may have been
said for or against the argument, McTaggart's final objection
is quite conclusive. To prove that a man must have had parents
is not to prove that his parents were either very good or
very intelligent. Likewise, to prove simply that the world
must have had a cause is not to prove either that the cause
was good or that it was intelligent. Such a conclusion
might be forced upon us by other arguments, but not by the
argument from the necessity for a first cause alone.
d. Defects of the argument's causal principle.
It should be made clear that McTaggart's
refutation of the argument is a refutation only of the par-
63ticular argument that he has stated. It does not preclude
the possibility of there being valid causal arguments for the
existence of G-od that do not depend on the same causal
principle as that on which the argument that has been dis-
cussed is based. I do not believe that there is any com-
pletely adequate causal argument for the existence of G-od,
but it seems to me that there might be constructed a causal
argument that would carry us much nearer the conclusion that
God exists than does the argument that has just been re-
jected. The fatal defect of that argument is not one that
is necessarily common to all causal arguments. It lies,
as I have shown, in the acceptance of the particular
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causal law on which the argument is based.
1 fa' r
That law is at best an abstract and unproved
hypothesis. It is only a descriptive principle arrived
at by observation of the sequence of events in the pheno-
menal world. It is an inductive generalization having no
necessary metaphysical validity as an explanation of ul-
timate causes. Furthermore, it depends on the false
assumption that all apparent reality can be satisfactorily
analyzed into discrete events. It disregards the fact that
analysis is not an adequate method for the true description
of the fluid character of either biological or mental life.
The causal law to which our discussion has reference is also
defective in that it ascribes to physical things a spurious
individuality. There is no true individuality in material
objects; that quality is to be found in personality
. alone
.
If material objects are treated as units in the causal series
and if their various modes are treated as discrete events,
it must be remembered that such a procedure is purely artifi-
cial and does not provide any real individuality on which
can be based a causal principle that is valid for all
reality. The causal law under discussion is purely abstract
and merely descriptive of the sequence of phenomena many
of which have no real individuality.
These defects do not inhere In all causal
65principles. A valid causal/ argument might possibly be
developed on the principle that the existence of every being
4\ . ' , i. i . f. i
*
must have an adequate metaphysical ground. If any "being
was not the ground of his own existence, an external cause
wo ;ld have to be sought. Empirical demonstration that
human selves could not be the grounds of their own exist-
ences would at least create a presumption in favor of the
necessity for a creative God.
e. Refutation of argument not refutation of hypothesis of
the existence of a first cause.
It ought to be understood, before we leave
McTaggart's treatment of the argument from the necessity
for a first cause, that his refutation of that argument
does not destroy the hypothesis of God's existence as the
first cause. At one point McTaggart's language seems
to imply that the hypothesis is untenable. He says that
"the hypothesis of a first cause involves us In hopeless
66difficulties." Taken in its context, however, this
statement means that the hypothesis is untenable as estab-
lished by the argument from the necessity for a first
cause that has been considered above. It is not a crlt-
clsm of the hypothesis as such. In another place McTaggart
says that there does not "seem any reason why we should
reject as Impossible a causal series with an uncaused
beginning." Such a series, I suppose, would not depend
on the causal law that is at the basis of the argument
that McTaggart has rejected. McTaggart's openmindedness
towards the possibility of the existence of God as first
I-
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cause is further revealed by a statement of his that if
time were real, "it might then he difficult to prove that
there was not a creative God." It is to be regretted
that McTaggart does not tell us just what considerations
would make it so difficult to prove the non-existence of
a creative G-od. Even though the direct argument for the
existence of G-od as first cause is shown to be false, the
idea of the existence of God as first cause may still be
appealed to as an hypothesis and not as the product of the
argument
•
3. The argument from design,
a. The argument stated.
Let us now consider McTaggart 1 s presentation
of the proof of the existence of God by the argument from
design. This argument is set forth in Some Dogmas of
Religion in a quotation from. Kant' 3 Critique of Pure
Reason.^ The quotation is a statement of the argument
that Kant classifies as the physico-theological . It in-
cludes the following points: (l) the world, a whole of
great variety in content and infinite in extent, bears
signs of wise and purposive arrangement; (2) the various
things in the world would never have combined in such
cooperation towards definite ends if they had not been
selected and directed by a rational disposing principle;
(3) there exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause of
the world; (4) the unity of the cause may be Inferred,
i
by analogy, from the unity of the reciprocal relations
between parte of the world. To bring this statement into
harmony with the more usual form of the argument from
design, McTaggart adds the characteristic of goodness to
the arrangements and their cause. He points out that the
argument does not hold that all parts of the observable
universe are good in themselves, but that some parts,
even intrinsically indifferent and intrinsically evil
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ones, are used as means to divine ends.
b. For G-od as omnipotent.
McTaggart holds that the argument from design
is useless as a proof of the existence of an omnipotent
God. He agrees with Kant that it could not prove the
existence of a creative G-od. The reason is that the mate-
rial of the universe might have been created by one being
and arranged by another. McTaggart quotes with approval
Kant's statement that "the utmost that could be established
by such a proof would be an architect of the world
,
always
very much hampered by the quality of the material v/ith
which he has to work, not a creator to whose idea everything
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is subject." McTaggart also agrees with Kant that there
is no reason to hold that the power and wisdom of such an
architect would be infinite.
If it was true, holds McTaggart, that a wise
and go od being used means to ends, it would follow that
he was not omnipotent. An omnipotent being could secure

ends without using means. Since the means have no value
except with reference to the ends, it would be inconsistent
with the wisdom of an omnipotent being to employ them.
"Insofar, therefore, as the nature of any fact in the
universe suggests that it owes its existence to its
utility as means for a divine purpose, it suggests, with
Just the same force, that the divine designer of the
universe is not omnipotent."'
It seems to me that this argument would
apply only to the use of means that were positively evil.
It surely would not be consistent with the wisdom of an
omnipotent God to use evil means to any end, for G-od,
being good, could will only good. But if the means was not
positively evil, why could not a G-od employ it if he
wished? The use of such a means would be an expression of
G-od's power, not a sign of limitation on it. There is no
essential unwisdom in the doing of a thing that is un-
necessary. G-od might find value in the use of apparently
valueless means towards more apparently valuable ends.
It is conceivable, according to McTaggart,
that a very moderately good being might have designed a
72
T
.vorld as good as the one that we can observe. The
argument from design cannot help us to establish the
existence of an omnipotent being who is as good as we
would demand that G-od should be. Furthermore, if it

does prove the existence of an omnipotent being, it posi-
73tively disproves the hypothesis that he is good. For
an omnipotent being to use any intrinsically evil thing as
a means to any end is incompatible with that being's
possession of the quality of goodness.
c. For G-od as non-omnipotent.
Turning to McTaggart 's discussion of the exist-
ence of a non-omnipotent and creative G-od, we find that he
again rejects the argument from design. McTaggart admits
that the objections based on the incompatibility of the truth
of the argument with the existence of an omnipotent G-od are
not relevant here. But he holds that it is still true,
even though a non-omnipotent and creative G-od might find it
necessary to use means to ends, that the universe might
have been arranged by a being who did not create it.
McTaggart again considers the argument from
design in his treatment of the hypothesis of a non-creative
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G-od. His conclusions are intended to apply to either a
non-creative God or a non-ormipotent and creative G-od.
His rejection of the consistency of the idea of G-od as
creative leads him to state that the argument, if it were
valid, could prove the existence onl" of a non-creative G-od.
McTaggart says that if matter or selves mechani-
cally arranged are held to be real, then the suggestion of

the presence of a directing mind arises from the fact that
nothing that we know about matter or the selves explains
the traces of order that we see. Even so, he holds, it
is only a great probability of a directing mind that we have
under these hypotheses. He contends that- there is a third
hypothesis, namely, that reality is a harmonious system of
selves, the nature of the system explaining the traces of
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order and goodness. It is not necessary to seek for the
cause of this system. There must be some ultimate unex-
plainable fact at the basis of every theory. It is no more
unreasonable to accept the system of selves as the ultimate
fact than it is to accept a God or a single first cause as
such. The onus of disproving the theory of a harmonious
system of selves rests on the supporters of the argument
from design. That argument cannot be conclusive so long
as this alternative remains. It is not impossible that both
such a system of selves and a directing G-od might exist,
but as long as that system does exist, it is impossible to
prove the existence of God by the argument from design.
It is MoTaggart's view that if the existence
of a director of the universe was proved, that director
could not be perfectly good because of the influences on
him of other selves that hinder him. His argument is based
on the assumption that the personality of God would be so
unified that to impair the perfection of any part of his
personality would be to make impossible the perfection of
i
any other part. But I sea no reason why G-od's power could
not he limited externally without destroying his moral
perfection. Of course, G-od's material goodness would be
impaired, but his formal goodness could remain perfect.
Formal goodness can be destroyed only by autonomous
volition; if G-od was hindered by other selves, he would not
then be completely autonomous. Formal goodness is essentially
more important than material goodness, for only formal good-
ness will insure the realization of the possible maximum
of value. Furthermore, although a supreme being might not
always be good, it must be possible for him to be perfectly
good at some time in order for him to be good at all. The
quality of goodness is absolute wherever it is found. There
is no reason why this necessary temporary goodness could not
be extended throughout the entire existence of G-od. If
McTaggart's argument is sound, no se: f can at any time be
perfectly good. If no self can at any time be perfectly
good, there can be no goodness in the universe. If perfect
goodness is found in a self at one time, there is no reason
why it could not always be there.
But, this question aside, McTaggart asserts that
a director of the universe could be good enough to be called
G-od, He holds, however, that the argument from design
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could not prove the sufficient goodness of such a being.
If it is possible that the director of the universe is

striving towards good ends and cannot help producing evil,
then, so far as the argument from design is concerned, it
is also possible that the controlling being is striving
towards bad ends and cannot help producing good. The
argument from design cannot tell us how good or how bad
the controlling being is. Therefore it cannot tell us
whether that being is G-od.
::cTaggart raises the further objection that if
the director of the universe is finite, we cannot be sure
On
that there is only one director. He maintains that many
of the facts of experience suggest at least as strongly
the existence of several beings working in harmony or
possibly partly in harmony and partly in opposition, "it
may not be impossible to revert to polytheism, or to con-
ceive God as striving against other persons who equal him
Q-i
in everything but goodness." But if a director of the
universe was no more important in power than these others,
he hardly could be called God. McTaggart's conclusion is
that the existence of G-od cannot be proved by the argument
from design.
4. The argument from necessity for an omniscient being.
McTaggart rejects the argument that the truth
of idealism involves the existence of an omniscient being,
who could be only God. This argument cannot be used to
prove the existence of an omnipotent God, for omniscience

does not imply omnipotence. It cannot be used to prove
the existence of a non-omnipotent and creative God, be-
cause an omniscient being could know reality that he did
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not create. Furthermore, the argument cannot prove the
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existence of any kind of God. It is valid for the
school of idealism whose fundamental tenet is summed up
in the words esse est percipi . It need not be recognized
by idealists who hold that the fundamental truth is that
to exist a thing must perceive. To the latter group
belongs McTaggart. It seems to me that whether he must
recognize the necessity for an omniscient being will
depend on whether he is successful in showing that indiv-
vldual selves can be the grounds of their own existences.
If a self cannot be the ground of its own existence, then
it must exist by virtue of the will of some other being.
Such a relation would imply that the being who was the
cause would know the other.
5. McTaggart 1 s conclusion on arguments! none conclusive.
It now appears that McTaggart believes that
there is no conclusive argument for the existence of God.
I believe that his criticisms have been sufficient to
show the inadequacy of the arguments discussed above,. His
treatment does not give attention to all the arguments for
the existence of God, notably the argument fron the objec-
tivity of value. It may be that McTaggart would consider

that argument to be a specification of the argument from
design. This is, however, mere conjee tire. Considering
the wide influence of the argument from the objectivity
of value, McTaggart is to be criticized for omitting _t
from his discussion.
D. External criticisms of the idea of God.
McTaggart presents certain external criti-
cisms of the idea of God. He rejects the idea of a creative
God on two grounds: (l) the creativity of God would be in-
compatible with the status of the other selves in the uni-
verse as primary parts of reality; (2) creativity would be
incompatible with the doctrine of the unreality of time.
He rejects the idea of a non-creative God on the ground of
the unreality of time.
1« Creative God versus primacy of the selves.
The first objection to the idea of a creative
85God runs as follows. A creative God would create all
selves other than himself. That would make God more funda-
mental in the universe than all other selves. This
cannot be, for all selves are primary parts of the universe,
and so are fundamental and ultimate constituents of reality,
"it would not, I think, be possible to combine this co-equal
primacy of the selves with such predominance of one self as
wo ild be involved in creation." In reply to this it may be
said that McTaggart 's proof of the primacy of the selves lias
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given them only a descriptive primacy. That is, at any given
moment, the selves are the true individuals that can be counted
as the constituent parts of all reality. Such primacy
of the selves would be compatible with their metaphysical
dependence on God for their existence.
2. Creative God and unreality of time*
The objection to the idea of a creative God
on the basis of the unreality of time is founded on the
assertion that some reference to time is essential to the
idea of creation.^ Creation woald be a non-reciprocal
relation. G-od would be the cause and the selves would be
the effects. Nov/, we cannot say that one thing is the
cause of another unless it is prior to it in time. "When
two terms are timeless or simultaneous, we can only say
that they are in a causal relation, without designating
"88
either of them as cause. Since time in unreal, creation
of the universe by God is impossible.
To discuss thoroughly here the validity of the
assumption that time is unreal would require too great a
digression. McTaggart's objection may be met more readily
by the establishing of the truth of the view that creation
does not involve reference to time. McTaggart's statement
that reference to time is im lied by the idea of creation
seems to rest on a misapprehension of what Gos's creation
of the universe means. He seems to assume that it involves
•
the kind of causal principle that was found, in the
discussion of the argument from the necessity for a first
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cause, to be so unsound. In accordance with that prin-
ciple, G-od's existence as the creator of the universe
would be a discrete event in a temporal causal series in
which the existence of the universe would be a separate
and posterior event. The cause of the universe would have
to transcend it temporally. All this, however, refers to
a metaphysically inadequate type of causation.
By saying that G-od is the creative cause of the
universe we mean that he is the metaphysical ground of its
existence. Let us first assume that time is real. On this
assumption, G-od may have existed before the existence of the
universe. Prior to the existence of the universe, he was not
the cause of the universe. As soon as his volitional acti-
vity brought the universe into existence, he became the
cause of the universe, the ground of its existence. If at
any time he should bring the existence of the universe to
an end, he would cease to be the ground of its existence,
for it would have none. In other words, G-od's existence as
cause of the universe is co-termlnous with the existence of
the universe, ^e is its cause by virtue of his immanent
activity in it. The causal relation is not time-transcending,
but simultaneous. Now, all this is on the assumption of
the reality of time. But if G-od's causal relation to the

universe on the assumption of the reality of time is
essentially one of simultaneity rather than of temporal
transcendence, why is that relation of simultaneous
existence impossible if time he held to be unreal^ If
time is unreal, all things exist simultaneously. G-od
as cause of the universe might exist simultaneously with
the universe, and it might be only by virtue of God's will
that such was the case. On the assumption that G-od and the
universe are timeless, it might be impossible to prove by
direct argument that God and the universe vrere in a non-
reciprocal causal relation, but I can see no objection to
holding the existence of that relation as an hypothesis.
If time is unreal, we are not confronted with the impos-
sibility of the existence of non-reciprocal relations
between causes and effects, but only with the empirical
difficulty of designating which terms are the causes.
McTaggart considers the suggestion that even
though creation must be a temporal relation, it is possible
that there should be a God who was in a timeless relation
to other substances, and this relation would be so like
creation that the result would not be gravely misrepresented
by saying that G-od was the creator of those other substances.
This attempted solution, he holds, would be false, for the
other selves would have to be co-equal with G-od, and the
causal relation would be reciprocal. This differs from

the ordinary meaning of creation enough to be a serious
misrepresentation. FurlSnermore, since, every self in
absolute reality desires the existence of everything he
knows, an omniscient G-od would desire the existence of
the whole universe. In this, however, there is nothing
analogous to creation, for the acquiescence in anything
depends on perception of it, and so on its existence.
G-od also acquiesces in his own existence in the same way
as he acquiesces in the existence of other selves. A
relation that he has to himself could not be analogous to
creation. The truth of McTaggart's objections to the
above suggestion depends on the validity of the hypothesis
that the selves are all ultimate constituents of reality.
If that hypothesis is valid, McTaggart's objections are
sound. If it is not valid, the causal relation need not,
as I have shown above, be reciprocal . and hence not com-
parable to creation.
3. Non-creative God and the unreality of time.
Let us now turn to McTaggart's rejection of the
idea of a controlling, though non-creative, G-od on the
91basis of the unreality of time. A controlling G-od
would not cause the existence of selves and their parts,
but he would be the cause of the occurrence of certain
qualities of selves and their parts. Divine control would
be, like creation, a non-reciprocal relation. Only in

time could such a relation exist. Therefore, since there
is no time, there can be no divine control. Although
there may he the appearance of a controlling G-od, there
is no real relation analogous to control. This objection
of McTaggart's is subject to the criticism that it falsely
assumes that there can be no timeless non-reciprocal
relations
•
E. Conclusion: McTaggart's critique not final.
LIcT aggart's critique of the idea of G-od has now
been presented under three headinss, namely, the consistency
of the idea of G-od, arsuments for the existence of God, and
external criticisms of the idea of God. UcTaggart has proved
that the idea of an omnipotent G-od is inconsistent. I have
shown that his view that the idea of a non-omnipotent and
creative God is inconsistent is unsound. That the idea of
a non-creative God is consistent has been demonstrated satis-
factorily. McTaggart has been justified, on the whole, in his
rejection of the arguments for the existence of God that have
been discussed. No serious external criticisms of the idea
of G-od have been successfully maintained. Since McTasGart
has not been able to prove that the idea of God as non-omni-
potent and creative and the idea of G-od as non-creative are
inconsistent, his critique of the idea of God does not consti-
tute a final disproof of that hypothesis. The establishing of
the truth of McTaggart's metaphysical system as a whole,
however, woald involve rejection of any theistic hypothesis.
i9
III. Summary of thesis.
The purpose of this thesis is to present a
descriptive and critical study of LIcTaggart 1 s critique of the
92idea of God.
McTaggart defines God as "a being who is personal
9*5
supreme, and good. This definition is in harmony with
contemporary theological and popular usage in the Western
world. Acceptance of it serves to clarify discussion of
94the idea of God.
The consistency of the idea of God is discussed
with reference to three hypotheses: God may be (1) omnipotent
and creative, (2) non-omnipotent and creative, or (3) non-
95
omnipotent and non-creative.
The idea of God as omnipotent and creative is in-
consistent. In the first place, no person could be omni-
potent, because all persons must be limited by laws of
96
rational possibility. In the second place, omnipotence
would be incompatible with the goodness of God, and God must,
7
98
9by definition, be good. To avoid ambiguity, God ought not
to be called omnipotent.
McTagrart holds that the idea of God as non-
omnipotent and -oreative is inconsistent. If God creates
evil, he is evil. There can be no external limitations on
the power of the creator such as to excuse his creating evil.
)
The hypothesis of internal limitations is meaningless. 10^
It would require a destructive division in the personality
of God. McTaggart 1 s conclusion, however, is not valid."1"01
The idea of G-od as non-omnipotent and non-creative
102is consistent.
After rejecting certain general arguments for
the existence of G-od, McTaggart goes on to refute the
argument from the necessity for a first cause, the argument
from design, and the argument from the necessity for an
omniscient being.
The argument from the necessity for a first cause
is rejected because the existence of a first cause is not
necessary an alternative to the existence of an infinite
regress of causes. 10^ Furthermore, if G-od exists In time,
why should it be said that he needs no previous cause while
104
all other selves or objects do? Whether he exists in time
or whether his existence is timeless, the argument makes it
necessary to believe that he causes changes while he him-
1C5
self remains unchanging. This is impossible. Finally,
the argument could not prove that God was either personal
. 1C6
or good.
The argument from design is also rejected. It
cannot prove the existence of a creative G-od» .because the

order in the universe might be due to a non-creative director
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of the universe. 1 An omnipotent God would not use means
l oft
to ends. If the argument proves the existence of an
omnipotent being, it proves that he is not good. G-od must
109be good. The argument from design cannot prove the
existence of a non-omnipotent G-od because a harmonious system
of selves could be accepted as the fundamental metaphysical
110fact. Furthermore, there is the theoretical possibility
that there might be more than one director of the universe
.
The argument from the necessity for an omni-
112
sclent being is not valid for all schools of idealism.
McTaggart criticizes the idea of a creative God
on the ground that the existence of such a God would not
be compatible with the primacy of the selves as ultimate
113
constituents of reality. •* Also, the idea of the creativity
of God is incompatible with the doctrine of the unreality of
114
time. Likewise, the idea of the existence of God as
non-creative is incompatible with the doctrine of the unreality
of tirr.e.
115
Since McTaggart does not establish the inconsis-
tency of the idea of God as non-omnipotent, his rejection of
the hypothesis of the existence of God is not a final dis-
proof of the truth of that doctrine.
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